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FROM CARIOCA TO KARAOKE: 
BRAZILIAN CUESlWORKERS IN JAPAN 
Lisa Bornstein 
Abstract 
This article examines the advent of a new phenomenon - the 
migration of Brazilian (generally of Japanese ancestry) guest­
workers to Japan. In Part I, Japan's 1990 immigration policy 
is described, and the scope of the migration and the character­
istics of the guestworkers are presented. In Part II, the article 
explores how two social institutions affect the migration pro­
cess. Based on interviews with guestworkers and recruiters, 
the author ;ugues that recruiters, and the economics of their 
operations, are greatly determinant of the types of jobs 
migrants get, and that the soda/ relationships underlying 
migration sente to mask the economics of recruitment. More­
over, the experience of the migrants upon arriving in Japan is 
also a product of soda/ relations, ones in which the ethnicity 
of these migrants is constructed primarily on the basis of their 
position in the labor market and their cultural attributes. In 
Part Ill, the migration of these lkazilian-Japanese, and the 
immigration policy permitting it, are shown to be rooted in 
the failure of alternative policy instruments to resolve labor 
shortages in Japanese industty and in fears over the impact 
of widespread immigration. 
This paper examines the migration of Brazilian guestworkers to Japan, and 
the dynamics underlying it. This phenomenon is an instance of a distinctive 
and surprising shift in the internationalization of Japan; Japan's traditionally 
closed borders are opening to a wide range of immigrants. While the Brazilian 
guestworkers are relatively limited in number, the implications of their immigra­
tion in terms of industrial development, community, and ethnicity are considera­
ble. This article provides a preliminary consideration of the dimensions and 
implications of this process. Part I of this paper provides data on the flow of 
migrants. Part II shows how social institutions affect the migration process 
and the reception of immigrants in Japan. Part I l l  assesses how the migration 
and the policy framework targeting Brazilians of Japanese descent have arisen 
out of the inability of other policy instruments to reduce labor scarcity and 
widespread social resistance to immigration. 
Migration has often been understood as an automatic, virtually inevitable, 
movement of people from poorer countries to wealthier ones. This, of course, 
is the intuitive view - Brazilians go to Japan because Japan now has a stronger 
economy. It is also the approach most frequently taken in the international 
press. This perspective underlies the central debate regarding immigration: 
to some, immigration poses a threat to the prosperity, jobs, and social stability 
of the country's residents, while to others, it adds to the economic dynamism 
of the country as new skills and capacities enhance existing human resources. 
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Such approaches, however, neglect the institutional context in which migra­
tion occurs. Immigration policy creates semi-permeable boundaries thorough 
which targeted groups may pass (Appleyard 1 989). Recruiters and social net­
works are critical to the pace and dimensions of labor flows (Portes and Bach 
1 985, Sassen 1 988, Boyd 1 989). As research with return migrants has shown, 
the reception of migrants by host communities may depend on factors other 
than shared national, ethnic, or religious backgrounds (Appleyard 1 989, Boyd 
1 989). Moreover, the demand for immigrant workers is grounded in particular 
labor market relationships in the host country as well as in economic and 
political ties to the labor-sending area (Sassen 1 988, Portes and Borocz 1 989, 
Piore 1 979, Massey 1 990). 
The recent migration of Brazilians to japan provides an opportunity to assess 
both social and economic dynamics of migration and to explore why japan - a 
country traditionally closed to migrants - has adopted a policy permitting selec­
tive immigration. This labor market policy of targeting foreign workers is closely 
linked to wider japanese industrial policies and practices. It indicates the limita­
tions of these policies, in particular the failure of globalization and moderniza­
tion strategies to reduce labor shortages. Most important, the legal migration 
of guestworkers is at the same time a response to growing tensions in japanese 
society - tensions due to the growth of inequality - and a source of that ten­
sion. While Brazilian migrants serve to cushion the effects of polarization in 
the japanese labor market, they also contribute to the process of uneven devel­
opment in the country. 
I. The Scope of Brazilian Migration to Japan 
In june 1 990, the Japanese government changed its immigration laws, impos­
ing economic sanctions on employers who hired illegal immigrants. Simultan­
eously, the law eased entry requirements for the one category of unskilled labor 
allowed to work in japan - Latin Americans of japanese ancestry. More than 
80,000 Latin American guestworkers, known as dekasegi, are currently in japan. 
From Brazil alone, an estimated 1 20,000 to 200,000 workers have made the 
journey to japan since the mid-1 9805. 
japanese interest in a guestworker policy is relatively recent. Labor importa­
tion programs began to be discussed in the early 1 9705, when labor shortages 
grew in japanese manufacturing. H owever, with declines in industrial activity 
following the 1 973 oil price hikes, demand for labor fell and so did interest in 
immigrant labor (Martin 1 991 ). For the remainder of the 1 9705, labor shortages 
were resolved through expansion of domestic labor sources as more part-time, 
temporary, and casual workers entered the labor market (Japanese Foreign 
Press Center 1 988, Chalmers 1 990) . Only in the mid-1 9805 did labor shortages 
again prompt employers to call for modifications to immigration policy and to 
look for workers from outside japan. 
I llegal immigration consequently rose throughout the late 1 980s. While relia­
ble data on the number of illegal immigrants are not available, one indication 
is the number of illegal aliens apprehended annually in japan: 2,000 in 1 983; 
1 8,000 in 1 988; and 23,000 in 1 989 (Martin 1 991, Economic Planning Agency 
1 990: 262). The japanese Ministry of justice estimated that there were over 
1 00,000 immigrants working illegally at the end of 1 989 (Economic Planning 
Agency 1 990: 262). Many of these immigrants came from other Asian and 
Pacific countries; the men were largely from the Philippines, Bangladesh, 
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Pakistan, and China, and the women from Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philip­
pines.1 Data on the occupations of illegal immigrant workers processed by 
immigration authorities show that immigrant men continue to be concentrated 
in construction and factory jobs, while immigrant women are mostly employed 
as sex-workers and hostesses, and in personal services (see Table 1). Mean­
while, legal foreign workers, aside from the vast Korean majority, have generally 
come from China, the Philippines, the United States, Brazil, and the United 
Kingdom (see Table 2). The data on registered foreign residents in Japan pro­
vide an indication of the recent growth of Brazilian immigration. 
The profile of Latin Americans working in Japan in the 1980s differed from 
other foreign workers in the country. Many had Japanese nationality (exclu­
sively or in addition to their Latin American citizenship) and were therefore 
legally permitted to work in Japan unlike many other immigrant guestworkers. 2 
Unlike other legal foreign residents, who were generally employed in skilled 
or professional categories, Japanese-Latin Americans were concentrated in 
unskilled jobs (PPRD 1991). 
The difference between the Latin American workers and the illegal immi­
grants was heightened by the revised Immigration Control Law of 1990. Latin 
Table 1 
Activities of Illegal Workers Processed by Immigration Officials, 1989 
Total Construction Factory 
. 
l::!!!!!m .§!!!!�! � Other .JL 
Philippines 3,740 769 299 2,2 1 1  83 1 24 254 22.5 
Pakistan 3,1 70 1 ,039 1 ,898 0 lS 1 8  1 80 1 9. 1  
Korea 3, 1 29 1 ,660 636 246 74 32 481 1 8.8 
Bangladesh 2,277 521 1 ,536 0 30 24 1 66  1 3. 7  
Malaysia 1 ,865 1 ,337 239 54 9 25 201 1 1 .2  
Thailand 1 , 1 44 91 1 74 703 41 39 96 6.9 
Taiwan 531 62 27 1 49 70 70 1 53 3.2 
India 1 79 70 91 0 4 2 1 2  1 . 1  
Colombia 1 52 0 1 45 1 4 0.9 
Sri Lanka 90 47 33 0 4 0 6 0.5 
China 39 4 1 4 3 3 4 1 1  0.2 
Other _ill .2!! __..§§ .2!! ____ll ___ll _2Z --1:!1 
TOTAL 1 6,608 5,653 5,01 9 3,564 365 357 1 ,650 1 00.0 
Males 1 1 ,791 5,581 4,696 5 227 260 775 
Females 4,81 7 72 323 3,559 1 38 97 875 
• Sex-workers: hostesses, prostitutes, and strippers. 
Sources: Daiwa Institute of Research (1 992) from Statistical Survey on legal 
Migrants, judicial System and Research Dept, Minister's Secretariat, 
Ministry of justice (Management & Coordination Agency, 1991 :  Table 2·32). 
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Table 2 
Registered Foreigners by Nationality, 1960-1989 
1 960 
Nationality Number .JL 
China 45,535 65.5 
Philippines 390 0.6 
USA 1 1 ,594 1 6.7  
Brazil 240 0.3 
UK 1 ,758 2.5 
Vietnam 31 0.0 
Thailand 266 0.4 
Canada 1 , 182 1 . 7  
Malaysia sa• 0. 1 
Germany 1 ,279 1 .8 
Other 6.976 ....1!!:.! 
Total 
Non-Koreans 69,309 1 00.0 
( 1o.n 
Koreans 581.257 ....§2d 
Total 650,566 1 00.0 
Notes: 
1 970 
Number .JL 
48,728 46.5 
3,035 2.9 
21 ,976 2 1 .0 
1 ,418 1 .4 
4,051 3.9 
1 ,041 1 .0 
1 ,046 1 .0 
1 ,538 1 . 5  
7 18  0.7 
2,740 2.6 
1 8.39S ....!L§ 
1 04,686 1 00.0 
(1 3.9) 
647. 1 56 ....!§.! 
751 ,842 1 00.0 
1 985 
Number .JL 
74,924 44.8 
1 2,261 7.3 
29,044 1 7.4 
1 ,955 1 . 7  
6,792 4. 1 
4,1 26 2.5 
2,642 1 .6 
2,401 1 .4 
1 ,761 1 . 1  
3,01 7b 1 .8 
28.376 ....1L.!! 
167,299 1 00.0 
(1 9.n 
683.31 3  80.3 
850,612  1 00.0 
a Sums for Malaysia and Singapore shown under Malaysia 
b Excluding former East Germany 
1 989 
Number .JL 
1 37,499 45.4 
38,925 1 2.9 
34,900 1 1 . 5  
1 4,528 4.8 
9,272 3.1 
6,3 16  2 . 1  
5,542 1 .8 
4,1 72 1 .4 
4,039 1 . 3  
3,3 1 5b 1 . 1  
44. 109� 
302,61 7 1 00.0 
(3o.n 
681.838 ....§2d 
984,455 1 00.0 
Sources: Daiwa Institute of Research (1 992) from Statistical Survey on Legal 
Migrants, Judicial System and Research Dept., Minister's Secretariat, 
Ministry of justice (Management & Coordination Agency, 1991). 
Americans of japanese ancestry were designated as the only group that could 
legally obtain temporary immigration documents as unskilled workers. Other 
foreign workers were given access under a few 'skilled employee' categories. 
This policy generally excluded people from Bangladesh, Thailand, and the 
Philippines, among others, who had been employed in unskilled categories. 
Harsh penalties were imposed on employers hiring illegal immigrants.3 
Available data on Brazilians going to Japan reflect the changes in immigration 
policy. Guestworkers from Latin America are now employed as unskilled work­
ers in manufacturing and service industries. Overall, 1 0.8 percent of all Japa­
nese companies employ foreign workers; 22 percent of these companies em­
ploy foreign workers in the unskilled category, "other, • in which most Japanese­
Latin Americans work (see Table 3). 
The number of Japanese-Brazilians working in japan has soared, with esti­
mates ranging from 1 50,000 to 250,000 guestworkers since 1 985. Estimates 
of the number of Brazilian guestworkers in Japan vary because, depending upon 
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Table 3 
Occupations of Foreign Workers in Firms Employing Foreigners, 1990 
Finns with foreign Workers 
in the Following Occupations 
language or other teacher 
Translator 
Technical specialist 
Research and development 
Professional specialist (lawyers, 
accountants, doctors, etc.) 
Clerical 
Sales 
Licensed cook and other services 
Management 
Other 
Sources: PPRD (1991). 
% of 
firms 
8.1 
21.1 
24.6 
20.6 
7.0 
17.6 
16.0 
15.1 
7.4 
22.2 
nationality (Brazilian, japanese, or dual), visas may be obtained in Brazil or 
japan, or are not required. 4 Due to the differing entrance and work permit 
requirements, data on migrants may grossly underestimate the number of Brazil­
ians working in Japan. Japanese embassy and regional consulates within Brazil 
have processed over 118,000 work visa requests by residents of Brazil with 
either second-generation Japanese ancestry !rrisei) or Japanese citizenship, a 
measure marking the lower limit of estimated Brazilian guestworkers (see Table 
4). Other estimates, which include all those of japanese descent (nikkei) who 
travel to Japan as tourists and obtain work permits there, range as high as 
250,000. 
Another indication of the flow of these workers is Japanese data that records 
numbers of entrances and departures of foreign nationals (see figure 1 ) . The 
figure portrays a growing gap between the number of Brazilians arriving in 
Japan each year and those departing. In 1978, for example, for 7,696 Brazilians 
who entered Japan, 7,592 departed. This correspondence between the number 
of arrivals and departures remains close until 1988, when there was a dramatic 
jump in both the absolute number of Brazilians entering japan and the number 
by which entries exceeded departures. In 1990 alone, over 67,000 Brazilian 
citizens arrived in japan. During that same period, approximately 36 percent, 
some 24,000, departed. 
Although the recruitment of japanese-latin Americans has received support 
in the form of policy revisions by the japanese government, latin American 
governments have been less willing to condone the practice. In Brazil, where 
recruitment of workers for overseas positions is illegal, government attention 
to the outward migration of Japanese-Brazilians has been restricted to enforce­
ment of the anti-recruitment law and other routine functions in processing the 
exit and re-entry of Brazilian citizens. No official policy has been established 
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Table 4 
}apanese-Brazilians Obtaining Work Permits in Brazil, 
by Nationality and Location of Visa-Granting Agency, 1985-1991 
Source With Japanese Nisei without 
of or dual Japanese 
Y§!._ nationaliJ:X citizenship 
Bras11ia 1 94 1 , 869 
Belem 
Curitiba 1 ,580 1 7,798 
Manaus 
Porto Alegre 
Recife 61 206 
Rio de Janeiro 241 1 ,520 
sio Paulo 8,734 81 . 1 32 
Total 
Note: "-": breakdown by category not available. 
Sources: RPFWJ ( 1991)  from Division of Emigration Policy, 
Japanese Consulate. 
Figure 1 
Total 
2,063 
3,403 
1 9,378 
1 87 
1 ,090 
267 
1 ,761 
89.866 
1 1 8,01 5 
Entries and Departures from Japan by Brazi l ians, 1 980-1 990 
70.-----------------------------------,
.., -g 60 
.. .. � 50 
..c: 
1-
; 40 . 
c. 0 � 30 
QL-------------------------------� 
1 980 1 98 1  1 982 1 983 1 984 1 985 1 986 1 987 1 988 1 989 1 990 
1 - Entries + Departures I 
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in the area of dekasegi migration. 5 This lies in stark contrast to the involvement 
of the Japanese government and industry in immigration, as is discussed in Part 
1 1 .  Due to the lack of Brazilian government involvement in promoting the migra­
tion flow, labor contractors and informal personal networks play critical roles 
in determining who migrates, into what jobs, and under what conditions. 
11. The Institutional Basis of Migration and Social Networks 
The previous section provided an overview of the dimensions and character­
istics of the labor flow. This section focuses on the institutions, particularly 
social networks and labor recruitment agencies, that influence the flow of mi­
grants, their characteristics, the types of jobs they occupy, anc;l their tenure in 
Japan. The role of recruiters in the migration process is frequently overlooked. 
For dekasegi, the characteristics of recruiters and the economics of their opera­
tions greatly shape who migrates and into what jobs. Migration mediated by 
recruiters differs from migration through family and business networks. The lat­
ter networks may offer improved employment conditions for the guestworkers. 
Ukewise, the reception of the immigrants der::ends on the social and economic 
institutions embodied in their guestwork status and not on shared ancestry. 
The data presented below on the characteristics of the migrants and the 
dynamics of the migration process are preliminary and based on two sources: 
(1) the author's research with a limited number (11 5) of guestworkers; and (2) 
the analysis of 5,000 medical records of migrants conducted by the Research 
Project on Foreign Workers (Nikkei) in Japan (RPFWJ 1991) (see Note on 
Methodology). The research clearly suggests that the labor flow is conditioned 
by four factors: (a) the labor market in Japan, especially the generation of jobs 
considered undesirable by Japanese workers; (b) immigration policy; (c) the 
economics of recruitment and the types of recruiters; and (d) familial and com­
munity networks. While the labor market factor is ·the focus of Part I l l , these 
latter three factors are discussed in greater depth below. 
A. The Characteristics of Guestworkers and their Jobs 
The 1990 revised Immigration Control law, recruitment paths, and the eco­
nomics of guestwork have greatly shaped who migrates and under what condi­
tions. The profile of migrants and their jobs has been marked by increasing 
diversity. As compared to migrants in 1988, when the migrants were predomi­
nantly male and all first- or second-generation Japanese (issei or nisei), those 
who intended to migrate in 1991 were both men and women and included a 
large number of non-Japanese spouses and children (see Table 5). This reflects 
a shift from individuals to families and an overall jump in numbers of migrants 
since October 1990. The 1990 (amended) Immigration Control law directly 
encouraged the migration of this new group of workers by permitting the migra­
tion of accompanying spouses and children, regardless of their ancestry. Addi­
tionally, the structure of Japanese wages, in which men receive approximately 
twice that of women, has prompted many Japanese Brazilian women to 
migrate as part of a family unit (thereby maximizing earnings) rather than alone.6 
Table 5, based on a passenger list of guestworkers sent on a flight to Japan in 
1991, reveals the growing number of Japanese-Brazilian women accompanied 
by their non-Japanese spouses. 
Guestworkers in 1991 generally were younger than those of previous years 
(see Table 6). They did not differ much in educational attainment (see Table 7). 
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Table S 
Demographic Characteristics of Migrants Based on Passenger List, 
September 1991 
Married, 
Travelling 
laJ!anese Ancesto:: Total Men Women Single as COUJ!Ie 
Second generation 1 8  9 9 8 1 0  
Third generation 34 1 5  1 9  1 8  1 6  
Fourth generation 4 1 3 4 0 
Sub-total (Nikkei) 56 25 31 30 26 
None (Brazilian) 22 ..ll ...1. ....!! 22 
Total 78 40 38 30 48 
Sources: Research by author. 
Table & 
Age Distribution of Migrants, 1988-1991 
Age 8/8S3 8/8ga 8/goa 7/91 a 1 991 b 1991 b 
in Years ...:&. ...:&. ...:&. ...:&. Number ...:&. 
0 - 1 9 6.2 5.8 9.6 12.1 20 1 7.7  
20 - 29 27.3 37.3 35.8 38.4 56 49.6 
30 - 39 1 6.5 24.6 1 6.6 1 8.5 1 8  1 5.9 
40 - 49 24.2 1 9.7  1 3.8 1 5.1  1 2  1 0.6 
so - 59 2 1 .4 9.9 1 0.8 12 .8 6 5.3 
> 60  4.4 2.8 6.3 3.0 _l 0.9 
Total 1 1 3  1 00.0 
Notes: 
a based on analysis sample of 5,000 guestworker medical records out of 
40,000, as reported in RPFWJ ( 1 991). 
b based on interviews with guestworkers conducted by the author. 
Sources: Research by author. 
Most of the guestworkers interviewed (78 percent) spoke only a few words of 
japanese. While the migrants were asked in the surveys and interviews about 
their income levels in Brazil, the data were extremely inconsistent due to rapid 
devaluation of the Brazilian currency during the period and the resistance of 
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Table S 
Geographic Factors Affecting the Recruitment of New Employees 
Percent Re(!!!rting Factor 
Not a Not Very Somewhat Very 
Location Factor � .E!£!21: lm(!!!rtant lm(!!!rtant lm(!!!rlant 
Housing Prices 1 20.5 1 1 .3 31 .9 36.3 
General Cost of Uving 2 1 8.5 1 0.6 36.3 34.5 
Quality of Public Schools 3 22.3 16.8 36.1 24.9 
General Economic 
Opportunities 4 1 8.0 1 3.7 48.7 19.6 
Traffic Conditions 5 1 3.5 1 7.9 49.2 1 9.4 
Climate 6 22.0 1 9.8 40.2 1 8.0 
Local Income 
or Property Taxes 7 22.2 23.0 38.1 1 6.5 
Low Crime Rate 8 22.0 20.2 42.8 1 5.0 
Higher Education Facilities 9 25.3 26.0 33.9 14.8 
Natural Environmental 
Quality 1 0  26.9 1 8.7 39.7 14.7 
Community Appearance 1 1  21 .4 1 6.6 49.4 1 2.6 
Local Cultural Facilities 12  27.4 31 .4 34.2 7.0 
Recreational Opportunities 1 3  31 . 1  24.3 37.6 7.0 
Population Diversity 14  26.7 35.7 32.0 5.6 
• Rank by percent reporting the factor very important in their current location choice. 
Source: Landis and Kroll, 1 990. 
new employees to move into the area because other factors, ranging from recre­
ational opportunities to good public schools, are also available. Significantly, 
however, the types of firms that were most sensitive to high housing prices in 
the recruitment of new employees were the same types of firms most likely to 
look for new locations when and if they expand operations. 
V. Housing Prices and the Movement of Firms: 
The Cood News and the Bad News 
For those concerned with the effects of high housing prices on the health of 
local economies, there appears to be both good news and bad news. The good 
news is that high housing prices did not appear to precipitate firms to move, 
and that the moves, when they occur, were likely to be at a short distance. 
That is, relocating firms generally preferred to maintain their existing connec­
tions to their suppliers, to their markets, and to their labor force. Thus, even 
where a firm was seeking a location close to more affordable housing. it was 
likely to be seeking such a location within the same metropolitan area. 
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Figure 5: 
Top 10 Recru i t ment Factors 
For Al l F i r ms 
Location Factor 
Housing Prices 
Cost of  L iving 
Publ ic Schools 
Economic Oppor tuni ty 
Traff ic  Condi l ions 
Cl i mate 
Local Taxes 
Low Cr ime Rate 
H igher Education 
Envi ronmen tal Qual. I 
0 1 0  20 30 40 50 
Pe t .  Repo r t i ng Factor as Ver y  I mpor tant 
Sourc e :  Krol l and La n d i s ,  1 9 9 0  
Some finns, however, showed a greater sensitivity to housing prices in their 
location decision. And firms that found high housing prices to be a major prob­
lem in their areas were, all else being equal, more likely to move beyond the 
county borders when and if they choose to relocate. Branch firms, located at 
sites distant from headquarters, were also likely to be particularly sensitive to 
housing prices and availability. In addition, the firms that fonned the core of 
many of the larger, more expensive metropolitan areas - high-tech firms, larger 
finns, finns with a high share of executive and professional labor - were also 
the firms that appear to be most sensitive to housing price issues. This may 
tend to dampen growth prospects in more expensive metropolitan areas. 
Of greater concern are the effects of housing prices on the recruitment of 
new employees, and thus on the ability of a business to expand at its current 
location. Based on the responses of firms to the survey, housing prices 
appeared to play a significant role in the ability of businesses to expand their 
employment base. Nevertheless, high home prices did not necessarily trans­
late into a finn relocation decision, because of the links between high home 
prices and other amenities attractive to key elements of the finn's labor force. 
On the whole, these findings suggest that industrial recruiters in low-priced 
housing markets will find it difficult to use their housing price advantages to 
lure businesses to their areas. Rather, in evaluating potential sites, relocating 
firms look to balance housing prices and public amenities and services - so­
called quality-of-life issues. Finally, these findings suggest that firms in industries 
in high-priced housing markets will continue to face pressures either to raise 
wages, or to provide financial assistance to their employees seeking housing. 
23 
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Table 7 
Educational Level of Migrants 
Past 1 991 
Level of Education Migrants � Migrants � Total 
None 1 1 .5 2 2.4 3 
Primary incomplete 3 4.4 8 9.6 1 1  
Primary complete 9 1 3.2 1 6  1 9.3 25 
Secondary incomplete 3 4.4 8 9.6 22 
Secondary complete 21 30.9 26 31 .3 47 
University studies 8 1 1 .8 12 14 .5  20 
University degree 23 33.8 ...1! 1 3.3 ..11 
Total 68 1 00.0 83 1 00.0 1 51 
Sources: Compiled from RPFWJ and research by author. 
respondents to questions about income. While the data gathered do not per­
mit comparisons over time, the majority of those migrating reported earnings 
between 1 and 10 times the minimum salary in Brazil, which corresponds to 
low- to middle-income earnings. 
jobs filled by dekasegi in japan have expanded from manufacturing and 
assembly positions in electronics and auto-parts companies in the late 1 980s 
to include various service occupations. Job advertisements for dekasegi in 
Japanese newspapers indicate that demand has expanded from auto parts 
manufacture and assembly in 1 985 to include a wide range of manufacturing 
and service occupations, including gardeners, truck drivers, security staff, cooks, 
hotel receptionists and maids, waitresses, and newspaper deliverers (RPFWJ 
1 991 ). Recruitment agencies now send people to work in electrical, food, and 
packaging industries and hotel, health care, and recreation services (see Table 
8). This is partially due to the diminished importance of brokerage fees in total 
revenues of recruiters, as discussed below, and to the decrease in demand in 
industrial sectors due to the current recession. job placements are made 
throughout japan, with heavy concentrations in smaller industrial cities of prov­
inces other than Tokyo and Osaka. 
Most guestworkers worked extra hours at bonus pay. In addition to the 
regular work week of 44-48 hours, the guestworkers typically reported an 
additional 60 hours of overtime per month. Ten- to twelve-hour workdays 
were the norm. There was some indication among those interviewed of a 
move away from long days and weeks. This was especially true of those 
migrants who intended to remain in Japan or those with accompanying family 
members. Others, whose primary objective was to return to Brazil with 
money as quickly as possible, continued to seek out those jobs in which 
overtime work was available. 
Employers generally provide housing and meals to single workers and some­
times to couples (if working in the same factory), deducting the cost of these 
56 
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Table I 
Diversification of Types of jobs Advertised 
Year New Twes of lobs 
1 985 assembly and manufacture of auto parts 
1 987 assembly of electronics 
manufacture and packaging of food products 
1 988 construction workers 
manufacture of electrical wiring 
nurses 
machine opel'iltors 
1 989 gardeners 
truck drivers 
security guards 
cooks 
l'ililroad maintenance 
assembly of elevators 
1 990 golf caddies 
Sources: RPFWJ (1991) .  
hotel receptionists and maids 
waitresses 
staff at "pachinco" houses 
newspaper deliverers 
services from the employee's wage. Health insul'ilnce similarly is covered by 
deductions from wages, employees do not receive end-of-year bonuses or job 
security, and have few chances for promotion within their place of employment. 
Other services needed by employees, such as japanese-language tl'ilining and 
schooling for their children, are not provided by employers. Local govern­
ments, unions, and Latin American cultul'ill associations attempt to fill this gap. 
B. Labor Contracting and the Economic:s of Recruitment 
In the analysis of migl'iltion, researchers have in�reasingly focused attention 
on social networks shaping migl'iltion systems (Boyd 1 989, Massey 1 990, Taylor 
1 986, Tilly and Brown 1 967). Through an examination of social networks, these 
researchers contend, it is possible to explain seemingly individual dynamics 
(who migl'iltes, when, for how long, with what frequency); economic relations 
(who gains, who loses, where gains and losses occur, how much, and at what 
point in process); and institutional inputs (effects of policy at micro- and macro­
level). Such studies add both depth and specificity to analyses based on politi­
cal and economic relations between labor-sending and labor-receiving coun­
tries. This permits a more thorough understanding of both the migl'iltion 
process and the design of policy interventions. 
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Due to the formal illegality of recruitment for overseas employment in Brazil, 
government participation in the migration process is limited, and a variety of 
other institutions have entered into recruitment activities (see Figure 2). The 
most common avenue for migration is through travel agencies owned fully or 
in part by Japanese-Brazilians. These travel agencies either have 'stringers' who 
recruit for them at the local level, are affiliated with Japanese-Brazilian busi­
nesses, or rely entirely on referrals made by their clients. They may have a for­
mal agreement to supply employees to Japan-based factories, Japan-based 
labor brokers (employment agencies), or both. Depending on these agree­
ments, some travel agencies specialize in certain industrial sectors - electronics, 
automobiles, hotel services - or certain geographical areas within Japan. 
The prominence of travel agencies in the recruitment process is not surpris­
ing since profits made on airfares for migrants provide a substantial source of 
revenue. The economics of recruitment in the early 1 990s differs greatly from 
those of the late 1 980s, when the migratory flow began to increase. At that 
time, airline tickets purchased within Brazil were extremely inexpensive 
(approximately $600) compared to the wages earned in Japan. This had two 
consequences. For guestworkers, it meant that they could recoup the cost of 
their airline ticket after a few weeks of work. Migrants could afford to return to 
Brazil more frequently and save a greater proportion of their wages during their 
first months in Japan (when most migrants pay back their passage to either the 
employer or the agency). For agencies, low-cost airfares meant that only a 
small portion of total income generated through recruitment activities derived 
from traditional travel agency functions. The majority of income came from 
placement fees paid by the Japanese employer; a lump fee was paid by the firm 
for the employment contract, and a fixed sum (typically $1  00) or proportion of 
wages was paid on a monthly basis for as long as the guestworker remained 
in a brokered job. These fees were distrib_uted · among the actors formally 
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Potential actors in the recruitment process 
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involved in the recruitment process for any individual worker - the japanese 
job broker, the Brazil-based agency, and local 'stringers.'7 Monthly fees for 
contracted workers generated long-tenn revenues for many agencies and indi­
vidual recruiters, providing baseline income independent of fluctuations in 
demand for more migrants. 
More recently, changes in exchange rates have greatly increased airfares to 
and from japan ($2,400-3,000). Additionally, travel agencies frequently have 
been able to take advantage of differences between the official exchange rate 
(used to calculate airfares) and the parallel exchange rate (used to purchase 
them). At the same time, japanese companies have become more active in the 
recruitment process, and labor demand in japan has fallen with the recession 
of 1 991 .  Recruitment agencies also increasingly rely on referrals by past clients, 
since most potential migrants (in fact, most Brazilian-Japanese) now have a rela­
tive who is working or has worked in japan. This has led to a shift in the revenue 
breakdown of recruitment activities, away from placement fees and towards 
travel services. This shift has been partially responsible for an expansion of 
the range of types of job in which guestworkers are employed. With the dimin­
ished importance of brokerage fees in recruiter revenues, there is increased 
placement of guestworkers in service occupations where monthly brokerage 
fees are uncommon. 
· 
There are additional avenues through which guestworkers obtain labor con­
tracts. While it is rare for individuals to go to Japan without an arranged job or 
prior contacts with a job placement agency, an increasing number of guestwork­
ers in Japan arrange employment for their relatives through their employers. 
Although it is relatively rare to find japanese manufacturers recruiting directly 
within Brazil, their advertisements can occasionally be found in the japanese­
language papers of sao Paulo. Brazilian companies, especially those with finan­
cial or technological ties to Japanese companies, may also arrange employment 
for their workers, often in skilled jobs rather than the unskilled ones that are 
typical of the travel agency recruiters. Workers may also be sent overseas 
through company, university, or other training programs. These routes, each 
involving distinct economic and social relationships, provide possible alterna­
tives to the dominance of intennediary recruitment agencies in the process. 
The ways in which recruiting paths mediates who migrates and the types of 
jobs they obtain is further illustrated by two cases I encountered in my inter­
views: 
i. The 'travel agent' as recruiter. A japanese-Brazilian works in a small travel 
agency. The company is half-owned by a Japanese and has a partner travel 
agency, staffed by two, in Tokyo. The company has contracting agreements 
with manufacturing finns in japan. The Tokyo-based office provides some 
placement services as well as support to guestworkers they have placed. 
Typically the agency receives a few faxes each week announcing the employ­
ment needs of Japanese companies. One announcement requests four 
women for a food preparation factory. Another requests one man for a 
paper factory. The agency has videos, made in japan, showing typical 
work. The recruiter maintains a list of those interested in migrating and tries 
to match the potential migrants with posted jobs. 
ii. The human resources mana&er as recruiter. A metallurgy company in sao 
Paulo has financial difficulties and half of the employees are going to lose 
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their jobs. The company uses machinery and inputs from japan and, conse­
quently, the human resources manager maintains a cordial relationship with 
managers of sever.�l japanese companies. When the Brazilian manager men­
tions his company's difficulties to one of his japanese colleagues, he is asked 
if there are any nikkei working there who would be interested in working in 
japan. Of the three nikkei working at the Brazilian company, two skilled 
workers go to japan to work in jobs similar to those they had in Brazil. 
The latter case is much less common than recruitment migr.�tion and, as is 
explained below, does not resolve many of the difficulties in japan that are 
prompting the recruitment of japanese-Brazilians. Yet the existence of migr.�­
tion through business contacts, and through family member$, suggests that 
guestworker migr.�tion could take place on a different basis. Similar concerns 
have been voiced by japanese observers, with some calling for immigration 
policies that include tr.�ining as an integr.�l component of japanese employment 
(see Shimada 1 991) .  
A common distinction made in social network analyses of migr.�tion is 
between institutional relations (recruiting agencies, government program and 
regulations, financial systems) and personal networks (family, friends, and 
acquaintances). In Brazil, recruiters cultivate relationships that blur this distinc­
tion. The illegality of labor recruitment for foreign employment further com­
pounds the "personal" nature of the migr.�tory process. Interviews with 
recruiters and migr.�nts suggest that the recruiters are seen as part of the per­
sonal network; because dealing with a recruiting agent is risky and the entire 
tr.�nsaction is illegal, potential migr.�nts contact recruiters on the basis of per­
sonal relations - family ties or referrals from friends. Migrants exclusively deal 
with those at the recruitment office whom they know. The travel agent 
described above stated that he had many people who only trusted the recruiter 
to whom they had initially been referred. Ukewise, in interviews with migr.�nts, 
they repeatedly explained their contact with the recruiter as, "my cousin went 
with them" or "he's my uncle's friend." Because of the issue of trust, migrants 
think of recruiters and their agencies as components of an extended personal 
network. This relationship masks the economics of recruitment and increases 
the dependence of migr.�nts on the recruiter. 
Of course, the direct familial network remains important. Many potential and 
first-time migrants eschew the recruiters and travel agencies/placement servi­
ces; their parents, brothers, or aunts find them jobs, often in the same factory. 
In  these cases, Brazilian family networks play a critical role not only in the spread 
of infonnation about the migr.�tion process - itself a great determinant of the 
char.�cteristics of the migr.�tion flow - but also in adjustment once in japan. The 
presence of other family members not only reduces loneliness and feelings of 
isolation but also helps in finding housing, jobs, schools, and childcare. Per­
haps surprisingly, japanese relatives - and many of the dekasegi have relatives 
in Japan - do not seem to have eased the adjustment of Brazilian guestwork­
ers; the guestworkers interviewed had minimal contact with relatives in japan. 
C. Strangers in Paradise? The Dekasegi and the Social 
Construction of Ethnicity 
While the consequences of the migr.�tion of japanese-Brazilians to japan are 
only beginning to be felt, there are indications of unintended consequences 
both within and outside of the place of employment. The employment of non-
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Japanese speakers on the factory floor has required modifications of production 
anangements, inhibited the functioning of work groups, reduced employee 
polyvalency, and shifted the communication of production-based learning. The 
migration of families and the entry of guestworkers' children into local schools 
has necessitated adaptations such as the hiring of Portuguese-speaking teachers 
and the provision of language training. 8 There is also a growing gap between 
the policies aimed at guestworker assimilation and the reality of micro-level 
tensions and exclusion. 
The guestworker flow between Brazil and japan is unusual in that it involves 
groups of people with a similar national background; a majority of those going 
to work as unskilled workers are, in great majority, of japanese ancestry. 9 I n  
this respect, the flow represents a return migration of japanese in diaspora, 
back to their home. Many of the guestworkers have relatives in japan, some 
are Japanese citizens, and most have Japanese physical features and at least 
some familiarity with japanese cultural traditions. From the Brazilian side, this 
presents difficult questions of cultural and national identity for many of the 
migrants. From the Japanese side it poses an equally difficult challenge of how 
to treat these newcomers, whether as returned relatives (based on kinship) or 
as temporary guestworkers (as is dictated by their position in the labor market). 
The immigration policy distinguishes among potential entrants on the basis of 
national origin, dismissing possible cultural differences rooted in their recent 
experiences in Latin America. It  raises interesting questions about the social 
construction of ethnicity; government policy has created an ambiguous cate­
gory in which it is unclear how these immigrants will be viewed and will view 
their own ethnicity. Are these guestworkers the 'strangers' in paradise, as 
depicted in the Brazilian newspapers? Or are they returned japanese, as some 
of the older guestworkers insist? 
The Japanese-Brazilians generally found that their status in Japan was deter­
mined by a combination of their labor market status and their 'foreignness'. 
Kinship, for instance, did not lead Japanese to treat their guestworker relatives 
as japanese. Only three migrants out of 60 interviewed had visited their rela­
tives. A few migrants stated that they did not feel welcome, while most 
explained that their relatives lived far away and they had not had the time to 
visit. Of those who had visited their relatives, two had done so when they 
were in Japan as tourists and not when they were there as unskilled workers. 
Migrants explained that their relatives in japan would be ashamed because they 
had gone to Brazil to "make a fortune" and had come back poorer than when 
they left, to work in low-level jobs. They further explained that receiving guests 
required too much preparation to justify a visit of a couple of days. Clearly, the 
guestworkers themselves were ashamed, and this shame prevented many of the 
migrants from seeking out their japanese relatives. But there is some truth to 
their concerns, as is illustrated by the one migrant who had visited his relatives 
during his holiday; he felt he had been welcomed only because he was issei, 
bom in Japan, and he felt uncomfortable with the request that he not bring 
any Brazilian friends from the factory with him during his visit. 
Similarly, some dekasegi reported that despite their Japanese physical charac­
teristics, they still walked, talked, moved, ate, and laughed in a non-Japanese 
way, and they were thus treated as foreigners. Many of the migrants inter­
viewed stated that they felt that they were doubly discriminated against. One 
guestworker, with repeat work periods in Japan, said that American foreigners 
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had a different set of social rules applied to them. In contrast, the dekasegi, due 
to their appearance, were held to japanese behavioral standards, and when 
they failed to meet them, were treated harshly. One migrant described walking 
down the street and being unexpectedly kicked by a native japanese and told 
to return to the jungle. Another complained of not being able to enter clubs 
without a jacket and a tie, neither of which he owned, while Americans were 
allowed to enter wearing blue jeans. Another recalled overhearing native Japa­
nese describing the guestworkers as uncivilized and barbaric. Still others 
expressed frustration at what they perceived as excessive control over public 
behavior; they were used to eating and talking loudly in the street, activities not 
viewed favorably by their japanese neighbors. Similarly, migrants recounted 
that shopping habits, such as sampling fruit, when continued by the guestwork­
ers within japan, led markets to label them thieves and start announcements 
on store loudspeakers about the danger of Brazilian shoppers. Even limited 
immigration generates micro-level difficulties of social adjustment and assimi­
lation. 
The experience of the migrants suggests that for the Japanese-Brazilians in 
japan there is a gap between the formal designation of ethnicity and its social 
content. Ethnicity, as a social category, is determined more by labor market 
position and cultural attributes than by kinship or racial attributes targeted by 
policy-makers. This gap is reflected in the designation of the guestworkers as 
dekasegi, a term with neutral connotations for the guestworkers but one that 
means 'outsider' and is associated with recent rural-urban migrants among the 
japanese urban populations. The jobs in which most japanese-Brazilians are 
employed are '3k' jobs - dangerous, dirty, and demanding (kiken, kitmai, and 
lcitsui) - further stigmatizing the immigrants, especially in the eyes of their 
native-born japanese relatives. 
I l l .  Immigrant Labor in the Context' of Transformations in 
the Japanese Labor Market 
While immigration policy, recruitment activities, and social networks are 
important determinants of the pace of migration - factors often left out of sim­
plified models of migration - attention must also be paid to economic changes 
occurring at the global level. These changes greatly affect the demand for, and 
supply of, migratory labor. This section outlines the structure of labor demand in 
japan and its relation to uneven restructuring and industrial growth. It  provides 
a preliminary assessment of how the migration process has resolved socio­
economic tensions. This assessment focuses on two aspects of economic 
growth in Japan: (a) labor shortages and their consequences for production, 
and (b) Japanese concerns regarding the social implications of immigration. 
Many theories of migration initially hypothesized that labor flows follow 
wage disparities (see Massey 1 990) . Given the clear disparity in wages between 
the two countries, such explanations for the rise of a migratory flow between 
Brazil and japan appear to have some validity. An unskilled worker in a SZo 
Paulo factory earned $100 to 200 per month in 1 991 (2 to 3 times the minimum 
salary). A professional, with a university education, frequently earned as little 
as $400 per month. Either one of these workers, employed in unskilled jobs 
in Japan, could earn $1 ,000 to 3,000 per month. This is a clear motivation for 
migration from the Brazilian point of view. It does not, however, explain japa­
nese immigration policy. 
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To understand the opening of the japanese labor market to immigrant labor, 
one must address the ways in which japanese immigration policy fits into wider 
changes within Japan, and between Japan and Brazil. Three major points can 
be identified. First, labor shortages are pervasive in japan, affecting a wide range 
of locales, industrial sectors, and job categories. Second, government policies 
recommending the relocation of manufacturing to other countries, the moderni­
zation of japanese-based industry, and the employment of disadvantaged Japa­
nese are incapable of resolving labor shortages. Third, the advent of immigra­
tion to japan reflects growing tensions within the japanese production system; 
these tensions are more fundamental than the temporary problem with labor 
scarcity. As such, targeting japanese-Brazilians reflects an effort to resolve labor 
shortages and other socio-economic tensions through immigration while side­
stepping widespread japanese resistance to foreigners, and especially to pro­
grams permitting the settlement of unskilled workers in the country. 
A. labor Shortages 
The new immigration policy in japan is most immediately a response to 
industrial growth and the rising cost and scarcity of labor. Unemployment in 
japan remains at about 2.1 percent, and labor market participation rates are 
already among the highest in the world. Based on 1 989 data, the overall labor 
participation rate was 77 percent and the rate for men of prime working age, 
25 to 54 �ars old, was 97.1 percent, higher than in comparable industrialized 
countries.1 0 Job openings increasingly exceed the number of job applicants; 
the ratio of opening to applicants rose from 0.8 in 1 988 to 1 .2 in 1 989, to 1 .4 
in 1 990, to 1 .5 in 1 991 . 
Labor scarcity has resulted in increased salaries and benefits for Japanese 
employees. In 1 990, the average wage increased by 6.0 percent, 0.8 percent 
more than in 1 989 and higher than in the previous eight years UEA 1 991 : 42).1 1  
The winter bonus, given to regular employees i n  core firms, rose by 6.8 percent 
in 1 990. Companies are also improving health and welfare packages for 
employees and granting more vacation days per year. Many large companies 
have built recreational facilities, or luxury company housing and dormitories 
for their employees UEA 1 991 :  65). Meanwhile, following the 1 988 revision 
of the Labor Standards Law, which legally reduced the working week to 46 
hours, employees have decreased the number of hours they work each week. 
Hours actually worked fell from 1 75.9 per month to 1 71 .0 per month between 
1 988 and 1 990. The percentage of firms adopting the five-day workweek has 
also increased, with 66.9 percent of all firms and 86.4 percent of all workers 
under this regime in 1 990 U l l 1 991 : 45). 
Despite improvements in working conditions, labor shortages have contin­
ued to affect a wide range of industrial sectors. Headlines in The japan Econom­
ic Almanac 1991 proclaim the dampening effect of labor shortages on industrial 
production; construction, autos and auto parts, petro-chemical products, rail­
way rolling stock, metal molds, and robotics production are featured cases. The 
Almanac reports that "inquiries by the Ministry of Labor . . . show that over 
half of all enterprises are complaining of labor shortages, with the situation 
particularly grave among the so-called '3k' industries" UEA 1 991 :  33). Small 
firms and those in the outlying provinces, which tend to offer salaries 40 per­
cent lower than large central firms, are also having greater difficulty contracting 
labor. In the metal mold sector, for instance, the Almanac reports that •a good 
63 
Berkeley Planning Journal 
many firms have been unable to recruit a single college graduate for several 
years" UEA 1991 :  121 ) .  
These are the jobs that are being filled by immigrant workers (see Tables 1 
and 8 above). The jobs are often characterized by dangerous, physically uncom­
fortable, or physically demanding conditions. Immigrants, both in japan and 
Brazil, frequently work in isolation or are occupied in work perceived as menial, 
such as janitors and personal attendants to the ill or infirm. Many are employed 
as assembly workers, but of the lowest level, and in companies that do not offer 
the most modem conveniences or working conditions. While the japanese 
government recommends that firms lacking employees hire older or disadvan­
taged japanese, or restructure to eliminate low-skill/low-wage work, the 
reality is that restructuring occurs at an uneven pace and often generating the 
very types of jobs that the japanese government hopes to eliminate. 
B. Restructuring: Globalization, Modernization, and 
Polarization of the Labor Market 
Globalization 
Government recommendations to resolve labor shortages through restruc­
turing of industry are unlikely to prove successful. Restructuring often entails 
relocation of manufacturing activities, and jobs, abroad. Japanese industrial 
and labor market policies have directly linked the issue of immigration to that 
of foreign investment. In terms of manufacturing operations, the export of 
production activities and jobs is a possible strategy to cope with labor short­
ages in japan. However, globalization of production is unlikely to relocate the 
kinds of jobs that immigrants fill. 
Government recommendations to relocate economic activity and jobs 
abroad have accompanied the export of considerable manufacturing activity. 
By the mid-1 9805, japan had become the primary source of foreign direct 
investment in the global economy, reaching $67.5 billion in direct overseas 
investment in 1 989. In the Forbes I nternational 500 list of the largest non­
United States corporations, japanese companies accounted for over one-third 
(1 87) of the total, for 47 percent of the $6 trillion in revenues, and for 48 per­
cent of the $4 trillion in market value. Over half of all japanese corporations 
with more than 1 ,000 employees had, by 1 986, set up production units 
overseas (Douglass 1988: 455). 
This strategy, however, has failed to do away with the need for immigrant 
labor. First, there are limits to the extent to which production may be globalized. 
While capital mobility may have led to some homogenization of economic 
space (Castells 1 989, Sassen 1991 ), it has also involved new forms of spatial 
differentiation, both in terms of industrial structure and labor markets. A strat­
egy of globalization and relocation of economic activities may not be viable 
since capital may not be as mobile as previously thought. Geographers have 
recently refocused attention on how manufacturing activities may be tied to 
particular production locales, either because of required inputs (scarce labor 
or raw materials), or because of less tangible externalities, such as reputation, 
relations with other firms (suppliers, clients), reliance on local governments 
and regulations, dependence on a local work or business culture, or lack of 
familiarity with other locales (Storper and Walker 1 989). Technological inno­
vation may depend heavily on a particular milieu (Castells 1 989), and service 
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jobs, from restaurant work to hospital staffing, must be performed on-site 
(Sassen 1 991) . 1 2 Additionally, small firms may not be able to afford the costs, 
in terms of capital investment and uncertainty, of relocation. 
Evidence of the difficulties of relocation abound, especially for smaller, poorly 
capitalized firms. The automotive sector provides a particularly striking exam­
ple. The system of Japanese automobile production is characterized by dense 
and stable inter-firm linkages, networks of large and small producers and sup­
pliers, spatial concentration, and stable and flexibly employed workforces. This 
organization has come to be known as the model for the next era of industrial 
production (Dore 1 986, Sayer 1 986, Womack 1 990). Globalization of japa­
nese automobile operations has occurred at a rapid pace, and it has entailed a 
radical shift in the stNcture of the industry within Japan. Since the industrial 
stNcture was one in which hierarchical supplier relationships were clearly 
defined, relocation of the operations of larger firms has left many smaller sup­
plier firms without purchasers for their goods. Although transplanting entire 
networks has been undertaken, this strategy is complicated by the large num­
ber of small firms involved, their lack of capital resources, and the heavy reli­
ance (due to narrower profit margins) of second- and third-tier supplier com­
panies on certain work ethics shared by their local labor sources. As a resul� 
many smaller firms have not relocated their operations and remain heavily 
dependent on the Japanese-based production activities of larger firms. 
A globalization strategy may be more generally limited by conditions in recipi­
ent countries, as can be shown with a few examples. For instance, there may be 
local resistance to direct investment from abroad; a case in point is the recent 
U.S. concern over Japanese acquisitions of high-tech firms, a concern crystalliz­
ing in legislative proposals to restrict takeovers and to increase taxes on japa­
nese-owned corporations in the U.S. U EA 1991 : 33). National content laws in 
countries receiving direct investment are another barrier to industrial relocation, 
particularly of supplier companies. There are also a limited number of places in 
the world in which investments are likely to generate desired rates of return. 
For instance, Japanese investment in Brazil has had lower and more unstable 
rates of return than in other countries. Given the constraints on globalization 
of production activities, it is not surprising that government recommendations 
to relocate as a way to resolve labor shortages have been unsuccessful. 
Modernization 
A second alternative to immigration recommended by japanese government 
planners is the modernization and restNcturing of industrial activities to reduce 
the need for unskilled labor. Regional planners generally point to industrial 
stNcture in japan, particularly the characteristic relationship between large 
and small companies, as a major barrier to implementing such a strategy. 
These relationships are critical to the slow pace and overall inability of small 
firms to either automate or reorganize production to eliminate low-skill and 
'3k' jobs. This perspective, while important, misses the more general barrier 
to restNcturing, the relationship of growing demand for low-skill labor to the 
functioning of global cities and the restNctured industry. The increasing need 
for unskilled labor is a consequence of a particular form of restNcturing rather 
than a signal of its failure to occur. 
The industrial stNcture of such japanese industries as auto production may 
inhibit restNcturing of smaller firms. As pointed out above, small companies, 
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especially lower-tier suppliers, are among the most heavily hit by the globaliza­
tion strategies of the large producers. These suppliers historically have had 
exclusive sales agreements with a small number of purchasers. Furthermore, 
these suppliers are companies that, at least in the past, have been used to 
spread risk throughout the industrial production system. As such, they tend to 
have a flexibly employed and deployed work force; they must be able to absorb 
unexpected and dramatic fluctuations in demand, and this is managed, in part, 
by reliance on labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive industrial practices. 
Although there are some indications that larger firms encourage their smaller 
supplier firms to modernize, such modernization has thus far been observed in 
relatively few firms (Asanuma 1 989, N ishiguchi 1 989) . This process is at best 
incipient and uneven, with a significant proportion of smaller firms still relying 
on labor-intensive production techniques. An additional complication to re­
structuring among smaller companies and those relying on '3k' work is the ina­
bility of the robotics and industrial automation sectors to keep pace with market 
demand. Ironically, labor shortages in the production of industrial automation 
equipment have resulted in higher prices and long waits for these products. 
Government recommendations to restructure - either through automation 
or relocation - are highly unrealistic in the short run, since they ask these com­
panies to eliminate the very quality that allows them to competitively fit into 
the social division of labor. As long as the second- and third-tier suppliers are 
used to absorb shocks in the primary sector, modernization and automation 
are likely to be limited. 
Polarization of the Labor Market 
The emerging labor market structure within Japan further suggests that low­
wage/low-skill jobs are unlikely to be eliminated. Contrary to models of indus­
trial development that posit a gradual improvement in the quality of all jobs, 
recent research into regional development highlights the polarization of jobs as 
an equally common consequence of economic growth. Within the emerging 
literature on the labor market structure of world cities, for instance, studies 
have noted that high-skill/high-pay and low-skill/low-wage jobs proliferate 
while mid-range jobs have become increasingly scarce (Bluestone and Harrison 
1 988, Buck et al. 1 986, Zukin 1 991, Sassen 1 991) .  As manufacturing leaves 
these cities for sites with cheaper labor, lower land costs, or other require­
ments, the jobs that remain are at the ends of the spectrum in sophisticated 
producer services, high-tech manufacturing. and upscale retail activities or in 
labor-intensive service and downgraded manufacturing activities. Japan's rise 
to a position of economic power has led some researchers, most notably Saskia 
Sassen (1 991 ), to question whether Tokyo, as a new global city, will be subject 
to similar processes of labor market polarization. Such approaches suggest 
that foreign laborers, in addition to bolstering firms which have not modernized, 
are also critical to companies that have rationalized operations. Morita (1 990), 
for example, argues on the basis of a study conducted by lyotani and Naitoh -
which found severe labor shortages in those small and medium-sized Tokyo 
companies that had shifted into high-value-added activities and rationalized 
production - that immigrant workers may not delay the adoption of new tech­
nological innovations. These processes suggest that '3k' jobs are integral to 
both high-tech and traditional activities in Japan and that industrial growth will 
contribute to continued demand for immigrant labor. 
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There may also be factors specific to the socio-economic composition of the 
Japanese economy that impinge upon or exacerbate polarization. For instance, 
traditional flat wage structures in which senior employees earn only two to 
three times that of production workers inhibit wage inequality. However, the 
continuing importance of small firms in the economy, firms characterized by 
worse working conditions, lower wages, and less job security than large com­
panies, contributes to a polarized labor-market structure. In  the 1 986 census, 
firms with less than 30 employees account for 96.3 percent of all establishments 
and for 56.8 percent of total employment. Even more significant in terms of a 
dual labor-market structure is the importance of very small firms as compared 
to large ones. Establishments with fewer than five employees accounted for 
68.2 percent of the total number of firms and for 1 9.4 percent of total employ­
ment; large firms, those with more than 1 00 employees, represented only 0.7 
percent of firms and 23.2 percent of total employment Ul L 1 992: 21 ) .  Average 
annual wages of full-time male workers in the largest firms is almost two times 
greater than wages in small firms (Keizai Koho Center 1 992: 68). Similarly, 
1 990 average monthly earnings in Tokyo Prefecture were 26 percent higher 
and average manufacturing wages 28 percent higher than respective earnings 
for the entire country (PPRD 1 991 : Tables 91 -92). 
Given the inability of relocation and restructuring strategies to resolve labOr 
shortages, the government and Japanese industries have pursued a third and 
parallel strategy: expanding domestic labor supply, especially by targeting 
married women and the elderly. Such strategies have contributed to dualism 
in the labor market while proving insufficient to satisfy labor demand. 
Changing job characteristics provide additional evidence of a widening gap 
in the labor market. Ministry of Labor statistics document the growth of non­
traditional employment terms, recording increases in "non-regular" employ­
ment, women's part-time employment, and employment of the elderly. The 
effects on individual income of non-regular employment can be easily demon­
strated. Non-regular employees, part-timers, and those not protected by stan­
dard employment rules represented over 25 percent of the Japanese work force 
in 1 990. For women workers, this proportion was even higher, accounting for 
over 40 percent of women's employment. While less than 1 percent of male 
workers worked part-time, 27.2 percent offemale workers, five million women, 
were employed on a part-time basis. Even when employed full-time, women's 
incomes are much lower than those of men. In the largest firms, the average 
annual wage for full-time female employees is less than half of that of male 
workers while, in small firms, full-time women earn 58 percent of what men 
earn (Keizai Koho Center 1 991 : 68). Part-time workers are also denied the 
benefits given to full-time regular employees. labor force data additionally 
demonstrate that the number of temporary employees (those with a work 
contract of between one and four months) has increased, from 2,520,000 in 
1 980 to 3,890,000 in 1 990 O I L  1 992: 24). These data suggest that as women 
enter the labor market and as part-time employment becomes more prevalent, 
greater disparities in individual income will emerge. 
In addition to the rise of immigrant labor, casual work, and temporary and 
part-time employment, there has been a reduction in the size of the core work­
force covered by life-time employment guarantees in the major companies 
(Kumazama and Yamada 1 989). One-quarter of non-student male part-time 
workers, for instance, when asked why they chose part-time work responded 
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that there were no companies in which to work as regular workers (PPRD 
1 991 : Table 82). 
Augmenting the labor force through employment of married women and the 
elderly is unlikely to resolve labor shortages, particularly in the short run. First, 
there are internal limits to increased labor market participation. While the labor 
force participation of women (aged 25 to 54) is much lower than that of men 
in that age group (63.2 percent vs. 97.1 percent), women's labor force participa­
tion is comparable to rates found in other industrialized countries. 1 3 Participa­
tion rates among the elderly in japan already exceed those of other industrial­
ized countries, on the order of 30 to 60 percent (J i l 1 991 : 1 4) .  Second, when 
the available jobs are seen as demanding, dirty, and dangerous - as is the case 
for many small-scale service and manufacturing operations as outlined above ­
increased labor market participation is only likely to occur due to economic 
necessity. While most working elderly (aged 55 to 69) are employed for eco­
nomic reasons, a significant proportion (over 15 percent of men and 30 percent 
of women) are employed for reasons other than the desire to earn or supple­
ment their livelihood (J l l  1 991 : 75). Further expansion of the labor participation 
rates of these groups is unlikely to occur in the near future. 
Other employment trends further suggest that the expansion of the labor 
market will not, at least in the short run, satisfy demand. Most notably, 
improved conditions of employment for core-workers, especially reductions in 
working hours, create new demand for employment even without additional 
economic expansion. 14 The incorporation of new groups into the workforce 
also generates employment demand; one example is the need for health-care 
providers for the elderly as women leave the home and enter formal employ­
ment. 
Increasing spatial and socio-economic differentiation within Japan has led 
to a debate over the distribution of wealth and the benefits of growth within 
Japanese society. Douglass notes, for example, that a discourse of 'haves' 
(rnarulcin) and 'have-nots' (marubi), stratified consumption, and divided masses 
has begun to emerge in the literature (Douglass 1 988: 440). More recently, 
even corporate executives have exhibited concern over labor's share of the 
benefits of growth. Sony Chairman Alcio Morita, for example, states that, in 
their efforts to improve competitiveness, "Japanese companies may have sacri­
ficed their consideration for their employees, shareholders, and communities" 
and questions whether "the salaries offered by Japanese companies [are) 
enough to provide employees with 'quality of life'" (Morita 1 992: 66) . These 
are indications that socio-political tensions are emerging from new patterns of 
growth and inequality. 
C. Immigration and Social Order 
The rise in both legal and illegal immigration reflects continued demand for 
labor, demand not satisfied through government-recommended industrial strat­
egies. Government authorization of the immigration of Japanese-Brazilians sug­
gests that this immigration fulfills certain functions and reduces specific social 
tensions associated with increasing inequality in Japan. These social tensions 
stem most directly from changing characteristics of the labor market and contin­
ued labor shortages. Socio-economic differences have heightened as day labor­
ers and illegal immigrants are increasingly incorporated into the labor market. 
The rise of immigrant labor, casual work, part-timers, and temporary employ-
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ment has occurred alongside the shrinking of the core of lifetime employees in 
the major companies. Social conflict over reductions in the numbers of core 
woriters and their privileges has been diffused through the incorpol'iltion of 
non-tl'ilditional groups among which immi8l'llnts figure prominently. Even if 
Japanese-Brazilians were to stay permanently in Japan, they would be unlikely 
to demand or receive the same types of worker rights and privileges as native 
Japanese.l S  Bifurcation of employment conditions is a further element in under­
standing the new Japanese immigration policy. Social tensions associated 
with an expansion, rather than contraction, of low-skill, undesirable '3k' work 
are mitigated by the use of immigl'llnt labor to fulfill these functions. 
Spatial differentiation arising out of Japan's economic growth includes polari­
zation within the Tokyo region and between the Tokyo area and the rest of 
Japan. The rising cost of land in Tokyo, the subsequent decentl'll ization of 
worker housing out of Tokyo, and the increasing distances over which Tokyo 
workers commute daily are prominent features of Tokyo's emergence as a 
global city (Fujita 1 990, Douglass 1 992). Regional differences in growth and 
investment have become more extreme, and both large and small companies 
outside of the major metropolitan areas have had greater difficulty in recruiting 
labor. 
The encoul'll8ement of guestworker migl'lltion from Latin America needs to 
be addressed within this context. The rise of Japan as a wor1d power and 
Tokyo as a wor1d city generates labor demand not only in the center (Tokyo) 
but also in the smaller industrial areas of Japan. In fact, the immigrants are 
dispersed throughout the country, with concentl'iltions in such industrial cities 
as Hamamatsu, Fujioka, and Ohta City as well as Tokyo. A case study of Ohta 
City, located about 90 km. north of Tokyo, found that immigl'llnt workers were 
most heavily employed in small and medium-sized firms (Koga 1 990). In these 
firms, immigl'ilnts accounted for a substantial share of the labor force: in firms 
with 10 to 29 employees, they accounted for 48.5 percent of the total; in firms 
with 1 to 9 employees, made up 37.8 percent of the total; and in firms with 
more than 30 employees, immi8l'llnts were about 16 percent of the total. The 
smaller firms were genel'll ly second- or third-tier subcontl'ilctors for one of the 
two major producers in the area, a tl'ilnsport equipment and electric machinery 
manufacturer. Production activities conducted by immigl'ilnts were those that 
the larger companies could not automate and therefore subcontl'ilcted to these 
small firms. The study also found that, while prior to 1987 most immigrant 
workers illegally came from South Korea, North Korea, China, and the Philip­
pines, legal Brazilian guestworkers now comprise the majority of immigrant 
workers in these firms. 
lmmigl'lltion, in this case, is controlled by government and industry, and 
opel'iltes in opposition to prevailing labor market tendencies towards concen­
tation in Tokyo. Immigration that, through recruitment pl'ilctices, directs work­
ers to specific jobs and locales thus provides a means to bolster companies that 
otherwise might not be viable due to non-central locations, shortages of labor, 
and inability or unwillingness to relocate or modernize. Thus, immigrant labor 
sustains firms that are located in periphel'll  areas, rely on labor-intensive pro­
duction techniques, offer lower wages, or require dangerous, dirty, and demand­
ing work. This is true not only in the service industries renowned in Europe and 
the United States for their dependence on immigl'ilnt labor, but also in tl'ildi­
tional manufacturing - auto parts, electronics, and electrical machinery. In 
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many ways this pattern complements findings of segmentation of production 
processes in the American gannent industry, Mexican food production indus­
tries, and Silicon Valley's electronics companies, where immigrant and other 
peripheralized workers are responsible for routinized, low-skill, and labor­
intensive work (Beneria and Roldan 1 987, Portes and Sassen 1 987). At the 
same time, the dekasegi are immigrants working in industries which are known 
for a different model of industrial production, one less Fordist, more flexible, 
less hierarchical, and more humanized. The incorporation of immigrant 
workers into these industries suggest that either these models were misstated, 
and never differed as much from Western deployment of labor as thought, or 
that the prevailing image of production in japan is greatly chaUenged.16 
I llegal immigration is one response to the increased demand for low-skill 
service workers and to the continuing demand for unskilled manufacturing 
workers. More important to the government's immigration policy than the 
actual numbers of illegal immigrants are widespread fears about the social 
consequences of foreign unskilled workers and the resulting political conflict 
over revising immigration controls.1 7 Shimada (1991) lists undesirable conse­
quences arising from immigration into japan. These range from exploitation of 
and human rights abuses against illegal immigrant workers 18 to the formation 
of an illegal underground involved in recruitment activities. There is also con­
cern over competition with japan's own disadvantaged workers, the possible 
formation of a dual employment structure, and the emergence of ghettos with 
their associated "social problems" (Shimada 1 991 : 8). Sasaki (1990) reports, 
for example, that there has been a sharp increase in violent crimes arising out 
of disputes among foreigners and that the 1990 Annual White Paper distributed 
by the National Police Agency dedicated a special section to crime by foreigners. 
The Ministry of justice, associations of Korean residents in japan, and many of 
the unions have opposed expanding the categories of unskiUed workers per­
mitted entry to the country (Shimada 1991) .  Meanwhile, a few employer asso­
ciations have lobbied heavily for some program of selective immigration. 
japanese government policy towards the immigration of japanese-latin 
Americans grows out of widely held preconceptions about immigrants. Fears 
regarding the long-tenn settlement of immigrants from South Asia, East Asia, 
and the Pacific have led to the creation of an immigration policy favoring those 
who have, as one migrant stated, "a japanese face. • Yet there is no certainty 
that japanese- Brazilians will figure centrally in future japanese industrial strate­
gies. There is a limited pool of potential immigrants in Latin America if the 
japanese government maintains its restriction of japanese ancestry. If labor 
demand in japan continues to grow, a cheaper and more temporary labor 
source would likely be targeted. In this sense, the recent immigration policy 
represents a temporary measure to ameliorate tight japanese labor markets -
an intermediate step towards defining a wider immigration policy. 
IV. Condusion 
Further growth in the japanese economy is likely to require creative means 
of coping with labor shortages. The economic repercussions of scarce and 
costly labor have already been felt in a wide range of japanese industrial sec­
tors. However, recommendations by the japanese government - to relocate, 
restructure, or hire disadvantaged workers - are unlikely to resolve the prob­
lem, at least in the short-run. While relocation and modernization may resolve 
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labor shortages for large, centrally located companies, these same strategies 
are likely to exacerbate the difficulties of smaller and peripherally located com­
panies. At best, there will be lag, with continued demand for unskilled work­
ers, until these smaller firms modernize or close down operations. And small 
service and manufacturing companies are extremely numerous and account 
for a substantial share of employment. Trends of modernization and the globali­
zation oflarse firms, when coupled with new functions performed by an increas­
ingly globalized Tokyo, also contribute to labor market polarization by generat­
ing larse numbers of low-wage or low-skill '3k' jobs. Such trends suggest that 
efforts to expand the domestic labor force are of limited efficacy in the long run. 
Since labor force participation rates are already extremely high by international 
standards, and new employment demand is for undesirable jobs, it is doubtful 
that additional domestic labor pools will be drawn into the market. 
In this context, the arrival of immigrant workers is not surprising. Prevailing 
concern over the social and spatial consequences of foreign unskilled workers 
has curtailed full-scale immigration programs. I nstead, Latin-Americans of 
Japanese descent, willing to take on undesirable jobs for wages at least five 
times higher than those available in Latin America, are tarseted for their "Japa­
nese faces. • The experience of these migrants is greatly shaped by immigration 
policies, the economics of recruitment by labor brokers, and the contacts of 
personal and social networks, all of which channel them into unskilled job cate­
gories. These institutions are as important in determining the migration pro­
cess as industrial demand for employees or the individual priorities of potential 
migrants. 
The new labor flow thus provides an opportunity to reassess our understand­
ing of processes underlying migration. Most theories of migration emphasize 
either immutable global forces, operating in uniform ways, or individual deci­
sions based on the benefits and costs of relocation. More recently, studies of 
migration have focused attention on the economic and social institutions gen­
erating migration and shaping the dimensions and dynamics of labor flows. 
This paper builds upon these studies of how migration interacts with other 
institutional spheres. Legal immigration is seen as emersing not only out of 
market pressures but also out of the failure of alternative policies to resolve 
labor shortages and reduce socio-spatial tensions associated with industrial 
growth. While theories addressing the economic and social consequences of 
macro-trends are adopted as a framework for understanding the international 
dimensions of labor flows, this paper suggests that immigration into Japan 
also grows out of the dynamics of uneven growth within the country. 
NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
Information on the demographic characteristics of migrants 
is based on an analysis of a sample of 5,000 medical fiche for 
migrants (out of a universe of 40,000 + medical records) con­
ducted by Miyasaki, Kato, and Mori. Information on job 
characteristics is based on interviews with 60 migrants and 
SUtve)'S of 1 15 migrants conducted by the author, and survey 
work with 1 1 1  migrants as reported by RPFWJ (1991) and 
Kato et al. (1992). Total number of cases reported in tables 
Viii)' due to non-responses to specific questions. 
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NOTES 
1 Four phases of illegal immigration to Japan can be distinguished: the first, characteristic 
of 1 950 through the mid-1 970s, was of Koreans illegally entering Japan (following the 
forced migration of a substantial number of Koreans) and then working for other 
Koreans; the second. starting in the mid-1 970s, was the migration of women from 
Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines as wives (arranged marriages), entertainers, 
hostesses, or sex-workers; the third, growing in importance after 1985, was of men 
from Thailand, Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to work in construction and 
small factories; most recently, following the 1 990 amendment of the Immigration Con­
trol Law, the nationalities of illegal immigrants has further widened, with Chinese and 
Malaysians now entering Japan. 
2The migration of Japanese-Latin Americans to Japan also grew out of long-term business 
and social relationships between individuals in the two countries. Unlike the Japanese 
communities in the United States, for whom World War II entailed a complete break in 
ties, the Brazilian-Japanese community maintained close ties to Japan. This represents 
a much more well-established set of links than in the case of recent illegal immigrants 
from Asia. 
31t is unclear to what extent the policy and sanctions are being enforced Illegal immi­
grant workers are common in small factories (see Koga 1 990), and may be found 
exchanging job information in railroad stations in larger cities. 
4Brazilians with dual nationality have the right to travel and work in Japan. Second-gener­
ation Brazilian-Japanese, nisei, are able to obtain one- to three-year work visas from 
Japanese consular and embassy offices in Brazil. Third-generation Brazilian-Japanese 
(sansei) and non-Japanese spouses of Brazilian- Japanese must enter Japan on tourist 
.visas, receive sponsorship from an employer, and obtain work visas of one to three 
years to remain in Japan. 
5covernment concern over the migration is growing. In December 1989, Latin American 
ambassadors to Japan met to discuss concrete solutions to problems associated with the 
migratory flow. In July 1991, five Japanese-Brazilian local officials in S1o Paulo provided 
statements to local newspapers regarding revisions in recruiting laws that they would 
promote. In October 1991, two panels of a conference on the dekasegi were dedicated 
to government policy and recruiting/immigration law. 
6Agency recruiters reported receiving many inquiries from non-Japanese interested in 
working in Japan. One reason for the large number of non-Japanese-descended men 
as compared to women may be the difference in wages commanded by men and 
women in Japan. 
7 Stringers also have rights to a small percentage of the fees generated by guestworkers 
referred by people they had initially recruited This has meant that stringers encourage 
recruited guestworkers to recruit friends and relatives. 
Bschooling needs of the guestworkers' children were not being met by the Japanese 
schools since the children spoke little or no Japanese. Some local governments, such 
as those in Hanagawa, Tochigua, Gunma, Mie, Aichi, and Okinawa provinces, have 
hired Portuguese-speaking teachers for public schools (Horisaka 1991) .  Relatively few 
regional governments have provided language training for the adult guestworkers; pri­
vate groups, often cultural associations, offer some support for the guestworkers in 
terms of cultural orientation. Other services, from Latin American markets and restau­
rants to financial services in remittance transfers, have also developed with the growing 
presence of the guestworkers. 
9fhere are two exceptions. The recent law has permitted spouses, regardless of ances­
try, to accompany Japanese-Brazilian guestworkers; the numbers of these non-Japa­
nese-Brazilians has grown only in the past year. A second possible exception is that of 
unconfirmed reports of the practice of "purchasing ancestry"; these reports, repeated 
in interviews with migrants and recruiters, suggest that it is increasingly easy to obtain 
false documentation of the Japanese ancestry of a grandfather or grandmother in rural 
areas of Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil. 
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1 llsix in..,strialized countries are used for comparative purposes. These include the 
United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Canada, and Italy. Data 
from Keizai Koho Center, 1 992. 
1 1Ministry of Labor data on the Shunto wage increase, the result of annual spring bar­
gaining by unions, record a rise of 5. 1 7  percent in 1 989, S.94 percent in 1 990, and 
5.65 in 1991 .  These are the largest increases since 1 982, when a 7.01 percent rise in 
wages was negotiated (Keizei Koho Center 1 992: 68). Other Ministry of Labour data 
suggest that while nominal wages have increased, the rate of increase in real terms 
decreased from 3.5 percent in 1 989 to 2.1 percent in 1 990 OIL 1 991 :  1 6) .  
1 2The 'Project Silver Columbus' proposal by the Japanese governmenrs Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) to construct retirement communities, complete 
with golf courses and medical facilities, for elderly Japanese in the U.S., Australia, 
Argentina, Spain, and other places, suggests that even non-mobile service jobs can be 
globalized to the extent that the people, or businesses, they serve can be encouraged 
to relocate. 
1 3See note 10 for countries used for comparisons. 
1 4fhere are pressures to improve the quality of life for core workers. ln..,strial execu­
tives and planners are arguing for a gradual transfer of the benefits of economic growth 
to the average population, incidentally increasing consumption and the domestic mar­
ket. Tight labor markets have further forced concession of better employment condi­
tions for core workers. 
1 5Just in case immigrant workers do consider organizing, rumors circulating in Brazil 
serve to dissuade them. For instance, I was told by a potential migrant that a group of 
Brazilians had been sent back from Japan, by boat, due to union-organizing efforts. 
This story was latfr repeated to me by two recruiters; the clear message was that union 
activities would not be tolerated. Nevertheless, within Japan there are a number of 
unions focusing on the working conditions and concerns of immigrant labor. 
1 6Labor shortages are directly responsible for shifts in the structure of Japanese net­
worked production. Toyota, for example, is setting up new factories in Japanese prov­
inces outside of Aichi, the province in which Toyota's network has traditionally been 
concentrated Managers directly attribute this shift in policy to the effects of labor 
shortages in Aichi Province. 
1 7The debates over immigration in Japan, including arguments for and against an open­
door policy, are reviewed in: Kazuaki Tezuka (1 989), Gaikokujin Rodosha (Foreign 
Workets). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha; and Tadashi Hanami and Y. Kuwahara, 
eds. (1 989) Asu no Rinjin, Gaikokujin Rodosha (Foreign Worke..: Neighbors of Tomor­
row). Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha. 
1 8studies have found that illegal workers are extremely wlnerable to exploitation. Assis­
tance organizations established to aid illegal immigrant workers report that many 
women are forced into prostitution, many workers have their passports confiscated 
by their employees and are thus unable to depart, and that many have difficulty obtain­
ing payment for the work they do (Ohshima and Francis 1 989). The situation is better 
for those who enter as students rather than tourists since students at least have the 
legal right to remain in the country; it is only their employment that is formally illegal 
(Shimada 1 991) .  
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